The EU’s Role in the Global Green Transition:

Tracking the EU’s trade and climate finance flows to developing countries

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Key Insights

But China asserted its role as the main source of environmental goods to the other regions, with the exception of the Caribbean.

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TRADE
The EU remains the largest exporter of environmental goods to Africa…
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Latin America followed, receiving ~20% of the total. South Asia and South-East Asia received ~17 and 7%, respectively.

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FINANCE
In 2022, ~53% of the EU’s aggregated bilateral mobilised private and public climate-related development finance was directed towards Africa.
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Among the key players in Europe, Germany leads in exports of solar panels, electric vehicles and wind power

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TRADE
The EU is the second largest exporter of electric vehicles and the leading exporter of wind power technologies to developing countries, while China dominates the solar panel market
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However, it should be noted that the leading recipient of mobilised private finance varied a lot across the years.

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FINANCE
Latin America attracted the highest share of EU-Mobilised private climate finance between 2012 and 2022.
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… with India (97.71 bn), Brazil (85.68 bn), Mexico (76bn) and Singapore (67.09bn) representing the biggest importing markets.

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TRADE
Latin America, Africa, and South-East Asia were the main importers of the EU’s environmental goods from 2012-2022…
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Africa has received steadily increasing volumes of both adaptation and mitigation finance over time, with adaptation gradually gaining ground and reaching parity with mitigation by 2020.

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FINANCE
The EU has progressively rebalanced its climate finance portfolio to support both mitigation and adaptation.
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Note: it is important to highlight that, given the study focuses only on exports from the EU, UK, China, and the US, it excludes other major players in the trade of environmental goods, including Japan, South Korea, and countries in Southeast Asia.

Analysis & Policy Recommendations

This section presents key findings on the European Union’s climate finance and environmental goods trade flows to developing countries, drawing on data-driven analysis and regional case studies.

It offers strategic recommendations for EU policymakers to improve coherence between trade and finance policies, align investments with partner countries’ priorities, and strengthen the EU’s global role in the green transition.

KEY INSIGHT 1

The EU remains the largest exporter of environmental goods to Africa.

The aggregate of EU exports have consistently dominated this market, although China recently became the second largest exporter of environmental goods to Africa. The US remains a minor player with no significant changes over the years.

Trade flows in environmental goods for Africa by exporter

Source: IMF Bilateral Trade in Environmental Goods

At the Member State level, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain are the main EU exporters of environmental goods to Africa, although each holds a smaller individual market share compared to China.

Main Source of Environmental Goods Exports to Africa, Cumulative total (in USD)

Sources: IMF bilateral trade in environental goods

Note: it is important to highlight that, given the study focuses only on exports from the EU, UK, China, and the US, it excludes other major players in the trade of environmental goods, including Japan, South Korea, and countries in Southeast Asia.

Historically, South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, and Morocco have been the largest importers of environmental goods in Africa. This trend has remained relatively stable, with Algeria increasing its lead over South Africa since 2014, and Morocco surpassing Algeria from 2019.

Historical imports of environmental goods by Africa, disggregated at country level

Sources: IMF bilateral trade in environental goods

KEY INSIGHT 2

In 2022, ~53% of the EU’s aggregated bilateral mobilised private and public climate-related development finance was directed towards Africa.

The EU has consistently been the primary provider of climate finance to Africa, with Germany and France leading these efforts among its Member States. In comparison, China and the US have maintained substantially smaller levels of climate finance contributions to Africa. Notably, China's contributions have declined in recent years.

Deployment of public climate-related development finance to Africa, yearly total amount, USD

Source: OECD Devlopment Finance for Climate and Environment, and AidData's Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset

Note: The EU aggregate represents the sum of Member States and Institutions

The analysis of private finance mobilised by bilateral public climate finance from 2012 to 2022 reveals several trends. The EU has consistently led in mobilising private sector funds for climate initiatives, with a notable surge in 2022. Mobilised private climate finance from the US and the UK have also increased. Germany and France have maintained steady contributions.

Private finance mobilised by bilateral climate finance in Africa, yearly amounts by provider

Sources: OECD mobilised private finance for development
Note: The EU aggregate represented the additon of Member States and Institutions

Country-level analysis reveals that bilateral public climate finance in Africa has been distributed across many countries, with Morocco, Ethiopia, and Egypt receiving the largest amounts.

Depending on the year analysed, different countries emerge as the largest recipients. Increases in one country are often offset by decreases in subsequent periods, demonstrating the high volatility and shifting regional focus of this support. There is no evidence of any single country becoming the primary focus of bilateral public climate finance.

Historical bilateral public climate finance received by Africa, disaggregated at country level

Source: OECD Development Finance for Climate and Environment, and AidData's Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset

POLICY RECCOMENDATION

Strengthen coherence between EU trade and climate finance policies in Africa

While the EU remains the leading provider of both environmental goods and climate finance to Africa, these two channels often operate in parallel rather than in synergy.

Leveraging the EU’s commercial footprint in environmental technologies – particularly in countries like South Africa, Nigeria, and those in the Southern Neighbourhood – can enhance the impact of climate-related investments, contribute to long-term green industrial development in partner countries, and, importantly, support the EU’s own competitiveness goals through value chain diversification and resilience, in line with the recently launched Clean Industrial Deal.

Building on its position as Africa’s largest climate finance contributor and trade partner in environmental goods, the EU should:

RECCOMENDATION

Integrate trade and finance planning

by identifying priority sectors and countries where clean technology exports can complement and reinforce climate finance interventions.

RECCOMENDATION

Support enabling environments

for climate-aligned trade and investment through regulatory cooperation, technical assistance, and capacity building. These efforts should be embedded within broader partnerships supported by the Global Gateway, and more specifically, by the development of Clean Trade and Industrial Partnerships (CTIPs).

RECCOMENDATION

Engage partner countries in co-defining investment priorities,

ensuring that EU trade and finance flows are consistent with nationally determined contributions (NDCs), country platforms, and green industrial strategies. This approach can strengthen ownership and ensure that EU support aligns with partner countries’ visions for a just and inclusive green transition.

KEY INSIGHT 3

The EU is the second largest exporter of electric vehicles and the leading exporter of wind power technologies to developing countries, while China dominates the solar panel market

Among the environmental goods analysed from the selected exporters, solar panels represent the largest export market by volume, with China maintaining a dominant position since 2012.

This dominance became particularly pronounced from 2015 onwards, peaking in 2021. Electric vehicles (EVs) represent the second-largest export category, with China again leading, closely followed by the EU. Although the EV market is growing rapidly, export volumes remain below those of solar panels, suggesting that demand for electric vehicles in developing countries is still maturing. Wind power technologies are the third most exported category, and in this area, the EU leads in cumulative exports. While the EU dominated wind power exports from 2012 to 2021, China overtook it in 2018, reflecting shifting global competitiveness in the sector.

Exports to developing countries of selected environmental goods (in USD)

Source: UNCOMTRADE

Although EU currently remains close to China in the EV market, we have seen a steep increase in exporting activity from China in the last 2/3 years which could signal potential changes in the future market. In other words, this reflects the point that if we continue along the current trajectory, China will soon dominate the EVs market.

At the Member State level, Germany is the EU’s primary exporter across the three technologies: solar panels, electric vehicles, and wind power.

KEY INSIGHT 4

Latin America attracted the highest share of EU-mobilised private climate finance between 2012 and 2022

During the observed period, Latin America received the largest share of EU private finance mobilised through bilateral public climate finance, followed by Africa and the Caribbean. The EU and the US mobilised comparable volumes of private finance through public instruments, with overall levels remaining broadly stable apart from notable spikes in 2019 and 2022.

Private finance mobilised by bilateral climate finance in Latin America: yearly amounts by provider

Sources: OECD mobilised private finance for development
Note: The EU aggregate represented the additon of Member States and Institutions

The EU led overall climate finance efforts in the region, with France, Germany, and Spain as the most active contributors. Notably, France contributed more than Germany in the region.

In terms of financial instruments, the 2022 data show that debt instruments (58%) and grants (39%) accounted for the vast majority of EU public climate-related development finance, with equity and other loans making up the remaining 12%. This breakdown highlights the EU’s dual approach of combining repayable and non-repayable support to address diverse financing needs.

Mitigation finance has consistently outpaced adaptation finance in Latin America since 2010, with the bulk of climate funding directed to the energy sector, followed closely by general environmental protection. The latter has been significantly supported by US funding, often channelled toward conservation and ecosystem preservation. The primary recipients of European public climate-related development finance in the region during the observed period were Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

Main destinations of EU bilateral public climate-related development finance: combined total (in USD)

Source: OECD Development Finance for Climate and Environment, and AidData's Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset

KEY INSIGHT 5

Latin America, Africa, and South-East Asia were the main importers of the EU’s environmental goods from 2012-2022

Export destinations of environmental goods varied across technologies. Most solar panel exports are directed to South Asia, followed closely by South-East Asia and Latin America.

In the case of wind power, Latin America is again the primary destination, with the Pacific and South-East Asia also registering high import volumes. While EU exports dominate in Latin America, demand in the Pacific and South-East Asia is now met by both the EU and China in roughly equal measure.

For electric vehicles, the Pacific region is currently the largest importer, followed by South Asia and Latin America. China is the main EV supplier to South Asia, while the EU leads in exports to Latin America. Though overall demand for EVs remains lower than for solar panels, the growth in exports reflects an emerging interest in sustainable mobility, with the Pacific acting as an early adopter.

For wind power, Latin America is again the primary destination, with the Pacific and South-East Asia also registering high import volumes. While EU exports dominate in Latin America, demand in the Pacific and South-East Asia is now met by both the EU and China in roughly equal measure.

Key technologies trade flows from exporters to importers:
Solar panels (in USD)

Source: UNCOMTRADE

Key technologies trade flows from exporters to importers:
Electric vehicles (in USD)

Source: UNCOMTRADE

POLICY RECCOMENDATION

Align climate finance and industrial policy to scale clean technology partnerships in Latin America

The EU should build on its strong position as a leading provider of mobilised climate finance in Latin America by deepening industrial partnerships around clean energy technologies and sustainable transport. While China leads in solar panel exports, the EU has competitive advantages in wind power and electric vehicles — both of which align closely with Latin America’s mitigation priorities, particularly in the energy and transport sectors.

To improve coherence, the EU should:

RECCOMENDATION

Use the Global Gateway and Clean Trade and Industrial Partnerships (CTIPs)

to strengthen clean energy value chains and promote industrial development in Latin America. These could include local EV assembly, grid expansion, wind and hydrogen infrastructure, ensuring projects deliver both decarbonisation outcomes and socio-economic benefits.

RECCOMENDATION

Take advantage of the 2025 EU-CELAC Summit

as a strategic opportunity to launch new partnerships in these areas, ensuring alignment with the region’s priorities for a just and sustainable transition.

RECCOMENDATION

Encourage blended finance mechanisms

that align public climate finance with the deployment of EU-manufactured clean technologies to the region.

KEY INSIGHT 6

The EU has progressively rebalanced its climate finance portfolio to support both mitigation and adaptation

Between 2000 and 2010, the EU’s public climate finance was primarily directed toward mitigation. However, from 2010 onwards, adaptation finance steadily increased, reaching parity with mitigation by 2020. This shift reflects a broader recognition of the importance of balancing immediate adaptation needs with long-term mitigation goals, particularly in vulnerable regions.

Total EU bilateral public climate-related development finance by objective (in USD)

Sources: OECD development finance for climate and environment
Note: Selecting both the EU27 and EU institutions represents the "EU" aggregate presented in other figures. The figure represents the amount of finance for a specific objective including cross-cutting support - which includes projects which are both adaptation and mitigation.

In contrast, the United States continued to focus predominantly on mitigation across most of the observed period. Adaptation finance remained comparatively limited until 2022, when a sharp increase made it the dominant focus. This shift likely reflected renewed commitments to climate action under the 2021–2024 US administration, accompanied by expanded pledges and multilateral engagement.

Africa has received steadily increasing volumes of both adaptation and mitigation finance over time. While mitigation was the primary focus until 2010, adaptation finance gradually gained ground and reached equal levels by 2020. This growing balance highlights the continent’s dual need for urgent adaptation to climate impacts and sustained investment in low-carbon development.

In Latin America, mitigation finance has consistently exceeded adaptation finance since 2010, largely driven by efforts to address emissions from energy, deforestation, and agriculture. Similarly, South Asia and South-East Asia have also seen mitigation dominate throughout the observed period.

In the Pacific region, adaptation finance has consistently surpassed mitigation finance, reflecting the region’s acute vulnerability to climate impacts such as sea-level rise and extreme weather events. Nevertheless, some fluctuations occurred during 2016–2018, when mitigation finance temporarily exceeded adaptation.

POLICY RECCOMENDATION

Despite headline figures, adaptation finance from the EU remains underdelivered, unevenly distributed, and often fails to reach the most vulnerable.

To close the growing trust gap with African partners and support the Nairobi Declaration and COP30 adaptation objectives, the EU should:

RECCOMENDATION

Prioritise grants and concessional instruments for African LDCs and fragile states

RECCOMENDATION

Direct more adaptation finance to locally led solutions, particularly in regions facing climate-induced insecurity

(e.g. the Sahel, Horn of Africa).

RECCOMENDATION

Support the EIB’s goal to increase adaptation finance as it enters the second phase of its Climate Bank Roadmap

ensuring alignment with African National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), NDCs, and broader development strategies.

Conclusion

In the current geopolitical landscape, marked by heightened economic competition and shifting global alliances, taking the lead on climate finance and trade in environmental goods with developing countries has become a strategic necessity.

By proactively shaping new climate partnerships, the EU can strengthen economic ties, enhance supply chain resilience, and secure access to critical raw materials essential for its own energy transition. Fostering sustainable growth in developing countries also helps mitigate geopolitical instability, reduces migration pressures, and expands markets for European green technologies and investments. 

However, climate finance and trade in environmental goods must not be pursued in isolation.

Climate finance is often shaped by international commitments, while trade responds to commercial logics and industrial competitiveness. Yet both can contribute to the climate transition in developing countries. Aligning them more strategically is essential for enabling systemic change. Trade flows must be underpinned by finance that supports capacity building, regulatory alignment, and downstream participation in clean value chains. Climate finance, in turn, should be designed with a long-term perspective, enabling access not just to technologies but to the markets, investment, and innovation ecosystems that sustain clean industrial development.

The challenge ahead is therefore one of coordination –  across finance, trade, industrial policy, and development cooperation.

Future EU strategies should aim to integrate these domains more cohesively, leveraging instruments such as the Global Gateway to facilitate Clean Trade and Industrial Partnerships that are equitable and transformative. This includes aligning export promotion with local development goals, supporting clean production standards, and ensuring that climate finance flows empower domestic industries and institutions in partner countries. Not doing so risks giving room to other global players who are increasingly positioning themselves as partners of choice in climate and economic development for emerging countries.

While this project offers a robust evidence base to inform European policy-making processes, it also highlights persistent data limitations – particularly regarding climate-aligned private investment, foreign direct investment (FDI), and the real-world climate impact of trade and finance flows in recipient countries.

Addressing these gaps will be essential to deepen understanding of how financial and commercial engagements translate into measurable decarbonisation outcomes. Future analysis should aim to cover a broader set of environmental goods that reflect emerging priorities in the green economy. Finally, integrating partner country perspectives will be critical to ensuring that climate cooperation is both effective and equitable.